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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Appeal is from an order of partial summary judgment
of the District Court determining the priority of a trust deed
with respect to certain real property located in Utah County as
against competing mechanic's lien claims, which the court reduced
to a final judgment pursuant to the provisions of Utah R. Civ.
P. 54(b) . The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal
pursuant to Utah Constitution Article VIII, Section 3 and Utah
Code Ann. (1953) § 78-2-2(3)(i).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the district court correctly ruled that

mechanics' liens for architectural services and engineering work,
like all other mechanic's liens, take priority only from the
commencement of visible, on-site improvements to real property
which constitute the time from which mechanics' liens take priority pursuant to Utah Code Ann. (1953) §§ 38-1-5 and 38-1-10.
2.

Whether the district court correctly ruled that

a judicial foreclosure has the legal effect of cutting off any
mechanic's lien claims attributable to, or attempting to relate
back to, work done prior to the date of such judicial foreclosure.
3.

Alternatively, whether an improvement establishes

only the priority of mechanics' liens claimed for the particular
improvement and extends only to such real property as may be

necessary for the convenient use and occupation of the improvement
under Utah Code Ann. (1953) § 38-1-4. x

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The

statutes whose

interpretation

and

construction

are determinative of the issues presented in this case are Utah
Code Ann.

(1953) §§ 38-1-3, - 4 , -5, -10 and -11, as well as

§ 78-37-3, which are set out verbatim in the Addendum.

(Add.

16-19.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a consolidated action to foreclose mechanics'
liens recorded against certain real property, which was to comprise the Heritage Mountain ski resort in Utah County.
419, 1259.)

(R. 155,

The construction lender, Guaranty Savings and Loan

Association ("Guaranty Savings"), moved for partial summary judgment asserting that its deed of trust with respect to the property
had priority over all mechanic's lien claims filed with respect
to the property.

(R. 1283.)

The mechanic's lien claimants op-

posed the motion and filed cross-motions for summary judgment
as to the issue of priority.

(R. 1454, 1537, 1549, 1772.)

The

district court entered a ruling in favor of Guaranty Savings,

1

In 1987, the Utah legislature amended Section 38-1-4,
Utah Code Ann. (1953). 1987 Utah Laws, ch. 170, § 2. The amended
text of § 38-1-4, Utah Code Ann. (1987 Supp.) is set out in the
Addendum.
(Add. 19.) All references to Utah Code Ann. (1953)
§ 38-1-4 are to the statute as in effect prior to the 1987 amendment, which had remained unchanged since the 1943 codification.
- 2 -

holding that (1) architectural services do not constitute commencement of visible, on-site improvements to which mechanic's
lien claims, including the provider of the architectural services,
will relate for priority purposes; (2) a judgment of foreclosure
in a prior action precluded the relation back of work subsequent
to such foreclosure to work which preceded such foreclosure;
and (3) there were no visible, on-site improvements predating
the construction lender's deed of trust to which mechanic's lien
claims could relate.

(R. 1934-39, 1990-98; Add. 1-15.)

The

district court certified its order as final under Utah R. Civ.
P. 54(b) (R. 1998; Add. 15) , and this Appeal by various mechanic's
lien claimants followed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants Sheldon L. Pollack Corporation and Norbert W.
Pieper, A.I.A., Inc.'s Statement of Facts contained in their brief
does not adequately summarize the history of the development of
the relevant real property or delineate the facts which were
undisputed at the time Guaranty Savings' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was heard by the trial court.

For that reason,

respondent sets forth herein a litigation history of the project,
a brief description of the parties hereto, and a statement of
facts which were undisputed and upon which the trial court granted
Guaranty Savings' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

- 3 -

A.

Litigation History of Project.
This is not the first litigation involving the property

which is the subject of this action•

A summary of the past his-

tory is as follows:
lo

Phase I (First Security Bank of Utah v. Wilderness

Associates, Civil No. 54367).

On November 17, 1982, the Fourth

District Court, through the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, entered
a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and specifically held:
[T]hat each person whose conveyance or encumbrance is unrecorded or was recorded subsequent to the plaintiff's filing of the Lis
Pendens herein be, and hereby is, declared
to be forever barred or foreclosed of all
right, claim, lien, and equity or other right
of redemption in and to the Total Property
or any portion thereof.
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, f 13.

(R. 1172).

A Sheriff's Sale was held on December 23, 1982, at
which time Paramount Life Insurance Company was the successful
bidder.

(R. 1179.)

Deed

later

was

There was no redemption and a Sheriff's

issued

to

Paramount

Life

Insurance

Company.

(R. 1191-94.)
2.

Phase II (Dwayne J. Sykes v. Wilderness Associates ,

Civil No. 62546).

Dwayne J. Sykes filed an action in which he

attempted to foreclose a mechanic's lien he had recorded with
the Utah County Recorder after the commencement of the First
Security

foreclosure action.

Sykes was not named as a party

defendant in the Phase I litigation.

The Fourth District Court,

through the Honorable George E. Ballif, ruled that Sykes' claims
for mechanics' interests

in and to any of the property were
- 4 -

extinguished pursuant to the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure.
(R. 1936; Add. 3,5.)
3.

Phase III (Pending Action).

This action was com-

menced by mechanics to foreclose their liens and asserting priority over Guaranty Savings.

B,

Classification of the Parties.
1.

Guaranty Savings. Guaranty Savings and Loan loaned

$16.9 million to Heritage Mountain Development, Inc., formerly
known as Wilderness Associates, Inc. ("Heritage"), secured by
Deeds of Trust as to which the priority issue of this appeal
pertains.
2.

Architects and Engineers.

One class of lien

holders consists of architects and engineers whose services were
limited to the conceptual planning of the development rather
than the performance of any work of improvement on the ground.
These architects and engineers include two of the appellants,
Sheldon L. Pollack Corporation and Norbert W. Pieper, A.I.A.,
Inc.
3.

Other Claimants.

The third appellant, Nordic

Constructors, Inc., is one of the contractors who performed labor
or supplied materials subsequent to the recordation of Guaranty
Savings7 Trust Deed in September, 1983.

Other parties below,

none of which have pursued an appeal, included other such contractors, entities associated with Heritage, and other lending institutions which do not claim priority over Guaranty Savings.

- 5 -

C.

Statement of Facts.
Guaranty Savings submits that the following are the

undisputed material facts upon which the district court entered
judgment as to the issue of priority:
1.
Resort,

Heritage

is a subsidiary

of Heritage

Inc., and at all times relevant herein,

Mountain

it, or its

predecessor-in-interest, Wilderness Associates, has had an interest in certain real property

(referred to as the "Property")

located in Utah County, State of Utah comprising the following
distinct interests:
a.

110 acres owned in fee simple

b.

41 acres

("Fee Prop-

erty") ;
leased

from

the State

of Utah

land under

Special

("Leased Property"); and
c.

4500 acres of Federal

Use Permit from the United States Forest Service ("Permit
Property"),
2.

(R. 1147-48; Williamson Dep. 20-39.)

In October,

1972, Wilderness

Associates

began

planning the development of a ski resort and related facilities
(the "Development") which would encompass the Fee Property, the
Leased Property, and the Permit Property in Utah County, State
of Utah.

(R. 1148; Williamson Dep. 20-39.)
3.

In December, 1976, Wilderness Associates leased

the Leased Property from the City of Provo with the consent of
the State of Utah for the purpose of setting up a sales and business office.

(R. 1148; Williamson Dep. 27.)

- 6 -

4.

On September 12, 1978, Wilderness Associates ob-

tained a building permit to remodel a barn located on the Leased
Property for use as an office building.

The remodeling work

included

sidewalks, entrance

sewer, water, roofing, parking,

way, replacement of windows, construction of offices, and interior
design-

The purpose of the office building was to serve as the

company headquarters of Wilderness Associates (and later Heritage
Mountain Resort, Inc.),
to that purpose.

and its use and occupation were limited

It was, and is, a self-contained building whose

use is not dependent upon the completion of the entire proposed
Development*

All remodeling work done pursuant to the building

permit issued in 1978 had been completed on the office building
by the summer of 1982, at which time all work thereon was suspended.

All sewer and water work contemplated by the building

permit were completed by the summer of 1980.

(R. 1148-49, 1156,

1245-46; Williamson Dep. 41.)
5.

On or about November 17, 1982, the Fourth Judicial

District Court of Utah County, State of Utah, with the Honorable
Allen B. Sorensen presiding, entered a Judgment and Decree of
Foreclosure on the Fee Property pursuant to Utah Code Ann. (1953)
§ 78-37-1

et

seq.

(the

"Paramount

Foreclosure").

(R. 1149,

1157-78.)
6.

Prior to the entry of the Judgment and Decree of

Foreclosure on November 17, 1982, the only work of improvement
actually done on the ground on the Fee Property, the Leased Property, or the Permit Property was performed at the location of

- 7 -

the offices of Heritage Mountain Resort, Inc., which offices
are located on the Leased Property.

This work was completed

before the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure was entered on
November 17, 1982.
cut.

In 1978, a construction access road was rough

(Williamson Dep. 106-08.)

Also between September, 1978

and the summer of 1982, ski trail design (including preliminary
flagging and some clearing necessary for design) was undertaken
on the Permit Property on the mountain.

(Williamson Dep. 43,

88; Compton Dep. 17-24.) The only other work initiated in connection with any property in which Heritage Mountain Resort, Inc.
had an interest before the Paramount Foreclosure was limited to
architectural, engineering, and surveying work, including core
sampling.

(R. 1149, 1246.)
7.

State

of

On December 23, 1982, the Sheriff of Utah County,

Utah,

sold

the

Fee

Property at

public

auction

to

Paramount Life Insurance Company ("Paramount"), pursuant to the
Paramount Foreclosure.
8.

(R. 1149, 1179-82.)

On April 21, 1983, Heritage Mountain Development

Company executed a Deed of Trust ("IMI Trust Deed") in favor of
Investment Mortgage International

(!lIMIfl) , as Beneficiary, to

secure the payment of $3,405,000 representing loan origination
fees for a loan to construct the proposed Development.

(R. 1150,

1183-90.)
9.

On June 23, 1983, subsequent to the running of the

redemption period, the Sheriff of Utah County, State of Utah,
delivered a Sheriff's Deed to Paramount. (R. 1191-94.)

- 8 -

10.

On June 29, 1983, Heritage obtained a $2,000,000

loan from Guaranty Savings and, in connection therewith, Heritage
executed a Promissory Note in favor of Guaranty Savings in the
amount of $2,000,000 ("June Note").
11.

(R. 1150.)

To secure the June Note, Heritage executed a Deed

of Trust with Assignment of Rents, ("June Trust Deed") with Valley
Title as trustee and Guaranty Savings as Beneficiary.

The June

Trust Deed was recorded on June 29, 1983 in the office of the Utah
County Recorder.
12.

(R. 1150, 1195-1210.)

On June 29, 1983, Heritage, using proceeds of

the June Note, repurchased the Fee Property from Paramount, which
delivered a Quit Claim Deed to Heritage.
13.

(R. 1151, 1211-14.)

No work of any kind, including work on sewer or

water lines, was performed on the Fee Property, the Leased Property, or the Permit Property between the time of the Paramount
Foreclosure of November 17, 1982 and the repurchase of the Fee
Property by Heritage on June 29, 1983, although certain staking
was done in connection with a survey done by Aztec Engineering,
Inc. at the request of the title company to identify the boundaries of the property.
14.

(R. 1151, 1246, 1592-96.)

On or about September 15, 1983, Heritage executed

a Promissory Note (the "September Note11) in favor of Guaranty
Savings

in the amount

of

$16,900,000.

(R. 1151, 1215-17;

Williamson Dep. 47.)
15.

To secure the September Note, Heritage executed

a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents (the "September Trust
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Deed") with Valley Title Company as trustee and Guaranty Savings
as beneficiary.

The September Deed of Trust was recorded in

the office of the Utah County Recorder on September 15, 1983.
(R. 1151-52, 1218-37.)
16.

The principal amount of the September Note in-

cluded, in part, funds to be utilized to satisfy the unpaid obligation evidenced by the June Note and an unpaid obligation of
$2,617,000 to IMI to obtain a release of the IMI Trust Deed.
There was never any intent on the part of Heritage to affect
the priority of Guaranty Savings' security interest in Heritage's
property obtained under the June Trust Deed other than improve
that position through the release of the IMI Trust Deed.

The

intention of Heritage was to assure that Guaranty Savings had a
first position security interest in the Fee Property.
17.

(R. 1152.)

Between the recording of the June Trust Deed on

June 29, 1983 and the recording of the September Trust Deed on
September 15, 1983, no work of improvement of any kind, including
work on sewer or water lines, was performed on the ground on
any of the Leased Property, the Fee Property, or the Permit Property.

The only work which was performed during that period in

connection with the proposed Development was by architects and
engineers and other persons planning the proposed Development.
(R. 1152, 1246; Williamson Dep. 47.)
18.

On October 6, 1983, a second Building Permit was

issued by Provo City for remodeling and reroofing the office
building and the construction of a pedestrian bridge.
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The work

contemplated by the permit was performed after its issuance.
Prior to the recommencement of work on the office building, there
had been a complete suspension of work on all portions of the
Property for a period of approximately one year,

(R. 1152-53,

1238.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court correctly applied the standard that
all mechanic's lien claims take priority from the date of the
first visible, on-site improvements to real property which are
part of a single project of development that has not been materially suspended or interrupted. Furthermore, the district court
correctly ruled that architectural and engineering services, while
clearly entitling the provider of such services to claim a mechanic's lien under Utah Code Ann, (1953, as amended) § 38-1-3,2 do
not constitute improvements to real property to which mechanics'
liens are entitled to relate for priority purposes under Utah
Code Ann, (1953) § 38-1-5.
Furthermore, the district court correctly ruled that
mechanic's lien claimants relate back only to work which is part
of a single project of improvement which is pursued with reasonable continuity and is not materially abandoned or interrupted.
Specifically, the district court correctly ruled that a judgment

*
Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Ann, was amended in 1987.
1987 Utah Laws, ch. 170, § 1. The 1987 amendment, however, is
not material to the instant case, although the pre-amendment
statute is technically applicable at all times relevant hereto.
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of foreclosure has the necessary legal effect of precluding the
relation back of any work performed with respect to real property
occurring after the date of such foreclosure to any work done
prior to the date of the decree of foreclosure.
Alternatively, any work on the Heritage headquarters
building prior to the judicial foreclosure could establish the
priority of the mechanics' liens only as to the Leased Property
because Utah Code Ann. (1953) § 38-1-4 limits the extent of
mechanics' liens to such real property as is necessary for the
convenient use and operation of the improvement to which they
relate.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

A.

THE DISTRICT COURT APPLIED THE CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD
FOR DETERMINING THE RELATIVE PRIORITY OF GUARANTY
SAVINGS' TRUST DEED AND THE MECHANICS' LIENS.

Mechanics' Liens Take Priority Only From the First Visible,
On-site Work of Improvement.
The central issue before this Court is whether archi-

tectural and engineering work, done prior to the recording of
Guaranty Savings' Trust Deed establishes the priority of mechanic's lien claims as superior to that Trust Deed.

Priority of a

mechanic's lien is governed by Utah Code Ann. (1953) § 38-1-5,
which provides in pertinent part:
The liens herein provided for shall relate
back to, and take effect as of, the time of
the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the structure or
improvement, and shall have priority over
any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which
may have attached subsequently to the time
- 12 -

when the building, improvement or structure
was commenced, or begun, or first material
furnished on the ground, (Emphasis added.)
As these requirements have been fleshed out in determinations by this Court, the establishment of a mechanic's lien
priority requires activity on the property that, either as the
result of work done or by the presence of materials furnished
to the property, visibly demonstrates that work has been commenced
or material furnished for the improvement of the property.

See

Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982) ; Western Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Construction Co., 18 Utah
2d 409, 424 P.2d 437, 439 (1967).

See also Note, 1966 Utah L.

Rev. 181, 187 ("usually, construction will be deemed to have
commenced at the time that some physical work is performed on the
ground, which can readily be seen and recognized as the commencement of a building").
As developed by a consistent line of cases from this
Court, it is not enough that there be visible signs of any kind
of activity but rather there must be some visible evidence of
work of improvement.
In Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah
1982), the Court rejected mechanics7 liens claim of priority
because ff[a]t no point up to and including the time [the lenders']
mortgage was recorded was it evident from the inspection of the
premises that an improvement had been commenced.M
added.)

(Emphasis

This is clearly more than mere "visibility." Moreover,

the Utah Supreme Court distinguished between visible work that
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does not constitute an "improvement" within the meaning of the
mechanic's lien statute (and to which all mechanic's lien claimants would be entitled to relate back) and other work (which in
fact is visible but does not rise to the level of an "improvement") . The Court stated that "visible evidence of work performed
provides notice to any interested party that work has commenced."
652 P.2d at 924 n. 1.
Earlier, in Western Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood
Construction Co.. 18 Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437, 439 (1967), the
Court construed

the legislative

intent behind Utah Code Ann.

§ 38-1-5 as follows:
We are not inclined to give the statute
such a broad meaning as contended for by the
appellants.
We are inclined to view that
the legislature intended the language "commencement to do work or furnish materials on
the ground" to be limited to relate to the
home or other structure which was being or
about to be built upon the land.
(Emphasis
added.)
Moreover, Western Mortgage

indicates that

work may not extend indefinitely

first

"qualifying"

into the past, but that the

visible work must be part of a single ongoing project and of
such a nature as would indicate to third parties that there was
ongoing work which might be the subject of subsisting mechanics'
liens.

424 P.2d at 439.
Also, in First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C. N.

Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979), the Court reiterated
the requirement of an improvement quoting an earlier case, Stanton
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Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 187, 341 P.2d 207,
209 (1959):
The purpose of the lien statutes is to protect
those who have added directly to the value
of property by performing labor or furnishing
materials upon it. (Emphasis added.)
600 P.2d at 524-25.
Even more recently, this Court has characterized the
point to which mechanics' liens relate back under Utah Code Ann.
(1953) § 38-1-5 as "the commencement of work on the ground.11
Duckett v. Olsen, 699 P.2d 734, 736, 737 (Utah 1985) (emphasis
added)

(per curiam) .

And in All Weather Insulation, Inc. v.

Amiron Development Corp., 702 P.2d 1176, 1177 (Utah 1985), this
Court noted, without comment and without reaching the merits, that
the standard applied by the Seventh District Court was the occurrence of the "first visible work performed on the job site."
(Emphasis added.)

See also Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 P. 2d 1051,

1054-55 (Utah App. 1987).
This two-pronged test (visibility and improvement) as
to what work is sufficient to establish the priority of mechanics7
liens is consistent with the dual purposes behind the mechanic's
lien statute. While the primary purpose, of course, is to protect
those who supply labor or materials in connection with any construction project, these interests must be balanced against the
legitimate interests of other third parties who may deal with
the property. The requirement of visible commencement of improvements establishes an objective test which may be applied to protect

the

interests

of third

parties,

- 15 -

including

construction

lenders such as Guaranty Savings, who advance money on the basis
of security interests in real property which is to be developed.
This balancing of competing interests which undergirds
the mechanic's lien statute has been consistently applied in connection with construing the mechanic's lien statutes since first
proposed by Thomas Jefferson and enacted in Maryland.

The Mary-

land Court, construing the successor to that earliest of statutes,
expressed the rule as follows:
[B]efore there can be the commencement of a
building which would give a mechanic's lien
claimant a preference over a recorded mortgage, there must be (1) a manifest commencement of some work or labor on the ground
which everyone can readily see and recognize
as the commencement of a building and (2) the
work done must have been begin with the intention and purpose then formed to continue
the work until the completion of the building.
RUDD

v. Earl H. Cline & Sons, 230 Md. 573, 188 Ac2d 146, (1963)

(emphasis added).

B.

Architectural and Engineering Services Do not Constitute
Visible, On-Site Work of Improvement Establishing Priority
of Mechanics' Liens.
While this Court's decision in Zions First National

Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 464 P.2d 387 (1970), expressly
determined that architects are entitled to a lien pursuant to
Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953),3 even if their work is
3

The decision in Frehner v. Morton, 18 Utah 2d 422,
424 P.2d 446 (1967), similarly does not support the architects'
claim to priority. While the lien claimant was a landscape architect, it was the actual landscaping, and not the design work,
that constituted an improvement giving rise to a lien. See 424
P.2d at 448-49. The case did not involve an issue of priority.
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never brought to fruition in the construction of a building,
the issue of priority was not involved, as expressly noted in the
opinion. The Court indicated in Carlson that the priority problem
would not justify depriving architects of their lien as against
the owner of the property.

Rather, the court concluded that

the priorities as between other third parties would have to be
adjusted (without deciding how such adjustment would be made).
464 P.2d at 389.
Indeed, the Court in Carlson, id.,

acknowledged the

reasoning of the most recent scholarly review of Utah's mechanic's
lien law published in the Utah Law Review, which concluded that
an architect's or surveyor's lien:
should attach at the time of the "visible to
the eye" commencement of construction. Otherwise, there will be no practical way for
interested parties to ascertain whether or
not liens have accrued on the property.

. . . . Before persons risk their services and materials by improving property,
or risk their capital by loaning money for
construction purposes, they should be able
to ascertain whether any prior liens will
dilute the value of the liens to which they
are entitled. If the difficult question of
whether construction has begun must be litigated in each case, both mechanics and financiers will be reluctant to become involved
in contributing to improvements upon land.
Note, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 181, 188 (emphasis added).
In the only Utah appellate decision addressing the
effect of preliminary engineering and surveying work, Tripp v.
Vaughn, 747 P. 2d 1051 (Utah App. 1987) , the Utah Court of Appeals
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determined that a survey which established the interior boundaries
of the property "were not sufficiently noticeable or related to
actual construction to impart notice to a prudent lender" that
work had commenced under the standard established by this Court
in Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982)
and Western Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Construction Co.,
18 Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437, 439

(1967).

See 747 P.2d at

1054-55.
The distinction between rights of mechanics against
the owner of property (where no priority issue exists) and the
adjustment of relative priorities of third parties is crucial
to a proper application of the mechanics' liens statute.

As

against the property owner, this Court has recognized that an
architect "may file a lien upon the property concerning which
he has rendered professional service, although his plans may
not be brought to fruition by erection of a building,"

Zions

First National Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 464 P.2d 387,
388 (1970) (emphasis added).

Nevertheless, as against third

parties, the priority of such liens relates only to the date on
which work is actually done on the ground or, assuming work is
never commenced, from the date of recording of the lien itself,
as discussed above (see pp. 12-16, supra).
Section 38-1-10, Utah Code Ann. (1953), expressly provides that all mechanics' and materialmen's liens are upon equal
footing regardless of the time when the work was performed.
Section 38-1-5 establishes that all mechanics' and materialmen's
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liens are given priority as of "the time of commencement to do
work or furnish materials on the around for the structure or
improvement11 (emphasis added) and "shall have priority over any
lien, mortgage, or other encumbrance which may have attached
subsequently to the time when the building, improvement, or
structure was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished
on the ground."4
The legislature's requirement that priority relate to
the commencement of visible work on the ground is based upon
sound policy considerations. To establish the priority of mechanics' liens by reference to off-site or non-visible work would

4

The mechanic's lien claimants attempt, through tortured
interpretation, to argue that the words "on the ground" only
modify the words "materials furnished" and not "work begun,"
such an interpretation is not justified given the wording of
the statute, let alone the interpretation of the Utah courts.
(See, pp. 13-15, supra.) If anything, the claimants' proposed
interpretation would lead to the creation of two classes of lien
holders.
There is no reason that a materialman should be required
to deliver materials to the job-site while a laborer who performs
services elsewhere is somehow entitled to have his lien attach
notwithstanding the fact that there was no visible work on the
ground. On the one hand, lien holders who provide only services
could claim that their services were deemed commenced for purposes
of priority when the first pen was put to paper at their offices,
whether by an engineer, an architect, or other labor intensive
contractor. On the other hand, materialmen could only claim
priority from the date the material was furnished on the ground
even though such materialmen would have performed many activities
similar to those of engineers and architects, while incurring
substantial obligations to provide the materials for the planned
improvements. Indeed, a materialman may be providing services
in connection with the fabrication of custom-designed materials
months before the material is delivered to the job site. Surely,
the materialmen's work in preparing for the delivery of the material to the project site is just as significant as the labor
intensive contractor's work in his office.
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prevent a construction lender from ever obtaining priority on a
project.

As a practical matter, loans cannot be made absent a

formal proposal setting forth, among other things, an explanation of the scope of the project and a presentation of the
projected costs to potential lenders.

This process generally

requires the preparation and presentation of professional drawings
and estimates.

Moreover, a prudent lender generally requires a

survey of the property, which may include the placing of stakes,
for the very purpose of inspecting the property to establish
the lack of commencement of construction.

If these preparatory

services deprived a lender of priority, the result would not
only be unfair, but loans would simply not be made in this State.5
The legislature specifically recognized this possibility and to
avoid such a claim provided that mechanics' liens attach upon
the commencement of visible work on the ground.

To do otherwise

^
The drastic, adverse effects that an alteration of
traditional rules of lien priority can produce are illustrated
by the effect of Senate Bill 300 enacted in 1983, which granted
a priority lien to condominium owners' associations for condominium maintenance fees and assessments.
1983 Utah Laws ch.
178, § 1 (amending § 57-8-20, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
As a result of that enactment, the secondary market for mortgages
on condominium units was eliminated. (See, e.g. , Memorandum dated
May 27, 1983 from Allen P. Miller, Regional Vice President,
Federal National Mortgage Association, a copy of which was submitted to the court and all opposing counsel at the hearing below.
(Add. 23.)) The legislature was forced to repeal the priority
provisions in a special session held the same year. 1983 Utah
Laws (1st Spec. Sess.), ch. 3, § 1.
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would have sounded the death knell of Utah's construction and
real estate industries.6
1.

The majority rule adopted by sister jurisdictions regarding the priority of architects' and engineers7
services fairly balances the interests of all parties
dealing with real property.
The analysis suggested in the Utah Law Review is iden-

tical

to

the

jurisdictions.

position

adopted

in

at

least

five

sister

Courts in the states of California, Michigan,

Nevada, Minnesota, and Arkansas have all determined that preparatory services of architects and engineers, do not constitute
the commencement of work which establishes the priority of mechanics' liens.

See Williams & Works, Inc. v. Springfield Corp., 408

Mich. 732, 293 N.W.2d 304 (1980); Aladdin Heating Corp. v. Trustees of the Central States Southeast & Southwest Pension Fund,
93 Nev. 257, 260, 563 P.2d 82, 84 (1977) ; Walker v. Lvtton Savings
& Loan Ass'n of Northern California, 2 Cal. 3d 152, 84 Cal. Rptr.
521, 465 P.2d 497 (1970) Reuben E. Johnson Co. v. Phelps, 279
Minn. 107, 113-14, 156 N.W.2d 247, 251-52 (1968); Clark v. General

b

The mechanics lien claimants make the argument, attractive on the surface, that a lender could easily protect itself
from adverse determinations of priority by requiring that architects and other providers of preparatory services be paid out
of the first draw on the construction loan. It is clear, however,
that this would not protect the lender, in view of this Court's
decision in Duckett v. Olsen, 699 P. 2d 734 (Utah 1985), which
determined that the first work at the site establishes the date
from which other mechanics' liens take priority, even if the
mechanic providing such work releases or waives its own lien
rights.
On the other hand, the architects and engineers, by
virtue of their contract with a developer, are in a position to
assure that they are compensated for their work either by
requiring payment in advance or out of the initial draws on the
construction loan.
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Electric Co. , 243 Ark. 399, 406, 420 S.W.2d 830, 834

(1967).

In addition, at least two sister states (Minnesota and Wisconsin)
have enacted the same rule by statute.

See Williams & Works,

Inc., supra, 293 N.W.2d at 513 n. 12. 7 .
Moreover, in Walker v. Lvtton Savings & Loan Ass / n of
Northern California, 2 Cal. 3d 152, 84 Cal. Rptr. 521, 465 P.2d
497 (1970), the Supreme Court of California expressly rejected

7

In addition, a host of other jurisdictions have expressly decided that work of architects, engineers and surveyors
does not constitute commencement of an improvement for mechanics'
liens purposes. See Haines, Jones, Farrell, White, Gima Architects, Ltd, v. Maalaea Land Corp., 62 Haw. 13, 608 P.2d 405 (1980)
(removal of a ceiling and door, boundary marking with pins, and
test borings not a visible improvement); Gollehon, Schemmer &
Assocs., Inc. v. Fareware-Bettendorf Assocs., 268 N.W.2d 200
(Iowa 1978) (survey, boundary marking with metal pins, and lathes,
marking pipeline and sewer easements did not "improve" land);
Torkko/Korman/Engineers, v. Penland Ventures, 673 P. 2d 769 (Alaska
1983) (design services not an improvement); Sheridan, Inc. v.
Palchanis, 172 So.2d 872 (Fla. App. 1965) (staking to locate
improvements to be constructed did not constitute commencement);
M. E. Kraft Excavating & Grading Co. v. Barac Construction Co.,
279 Minn. 278, 156 N.W.2d 748 (1968) (preliminary staking of
tract did not constitute commencement) ; Diversified Mortgage
Investors v. Lloyd D. Blaylock General Contractor, Inc., 57 6
S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1978) (survey, staking, and test holes do not
constitute commencement); Mortgage Associates, Inc. v. Monona
Shores, Inc., 47 Wis. 2d 171, 177 N.W.2d 340 (1970) (placing of
stakes to indicate street layout and cut and fill levels did
not constitute commencement of an improvement under the lien
statute); Herriman National Bank v. North Shaker Boulevard Co.,
22 Ohio App. 487, 153 N.E. 909 (Ohio 1924) (digging of test hole
and the driving of stakes locating the improvements did not constitute commencement) ; H. B. Deal Construction Co. v. Labor
Discount Center, Inc., 418 S.W.2d 940 (Mo. 1967) (surveying work
to determine boundary of property, location of building, and
placement of stakes for excavation purposes was not commencement) ;
Roberts v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 222 So.2d 32 (Fla.
1969) (placement of surveyor stakes was not commencement); Reuben
E. Johnson Co. v. Phelps, 279 Minn. 107, 156 N.W.2d 247 (1968)
(placement of boundary markers and grade stakes was not commencement) ; Tracy Price Associates v. Hebard, 266 Cal. App. 2d 778,
72 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1968).
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the argument that a mortgage lender may not assert priority of
its secured interest over that of an architect where the mortgage lender had actual knowledge of architects7 plans and specifications in connection with making the loan.
The Walker decision stated that, to establish an architect's lien prior to commencement of the actual work on the site:
[W]ould appear to confuse, if not destroy,
the statutory scheme of priorities . . . .
But if, despite these specific and detailed rules laid down by the Legislature,
it be held for the benefit of plaintiff architects that even though, as here, an encumbrance has attached before any work has been
done on the owners' property or materials
delivered thereto for a planned improvement,
nevertheless the work of improvement had commenced earlier when the architects began work
on the plans and specifications, then all
liens of all others who contributed work and
materials to the work of improvement [reference omitted] would likewise relate back to
the earlier date of commencement and thereby
take priority over the subsequent encumbrance—whether given for a construction
loan or based on some other consideration.
That the Legislature intended no such result
seems obvious.
Additionally, under such
circumstances it would appear that construction loans would shortly become next to impossible to obtain, as it is a rare construction
project of any magnitude which does not require the preliminary nonvisible services
of architects or engineers. But if all liens
arising from the subsequent construction
will relate back to the date of commencement
of the nonvisible services, how many prudent
businessmen would be willing to assume the
risk?
. . . . It is a matter of common knowledge that construction loans are not bestowed
in a vacuum and without awareness and approval
by lenders of the nature and detail of the
proposed improvements which the owner has
requested the lender to finance.
If the
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lender's use and reliance upon the plans
prepared by an architect on behalf of the
owner is to work a change in the statutory
priority rules, the change must be sought
from the Legislature and not from this court.
465 Pc2d at 502-03.

See also Tracy Price Associates v. Hebard,

266 Cal. App. 2d 778, 72 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1968).
More recently, the Supreme Court of Michigan has determined that services of an engineer, including on-site soil borings
and surveys, do not constitute the commencement of work which
establishes the priorities under Michigan mechanic's lien law.
See Williams & Works, Inc. v. Springfield Corp. 408 Mich. 732,
293 NoW.2d 304 (1980).
As with Utah's statute, Michigan's mechanic's lien law
was amended to specifically provide a lien for the work of engineers.

Nevertheless, the Michigan court expressly rejected the

argument that by amending the mechanic's lien statute to include
engineers' services, the Michigan legislature had also intended
to overturn the requirement of visible, on-site commencement of
construction:
[W]e think it unreasonable to believe
the Legislature intended to indirectly change
[the sections of the mechanic's lien statute
establishing priorities], containing the
traditional and well-established rule requiring a visible, on-site commencement of construction in order to establish priority,
by the simple expansion of the lienable services outlined in a different section. . . .
[Those sections] treat of fsic] two entirely
different concepts. [One] merely determines
what is a lienable service in Michigan. It
runs the gamut from the furnisher of labor
and materials to the surveyor and engineer
to the renter or lessor of equipment and
the supplier of nursery stock.
[Reference
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omitted.] [The other section], on the other
hand, deals with the determination of when
a particular lien attaches for priority purposes.
It specifically leaves the establishment of what services are lienable to
another part of the act . . . and concerns
itself primarily with the ascertainment of
priority among the liens. . . .

We feel our holding today is consonant
with the great weight of modern judicial authority. . . .
293 N.W.2d at 311-12 (emphasis in original).
The Michigan court also specifically rejected the argument that a mortgage lender who relies on plans and specifications
prepared by an architect or engineer is somehow estopped from
relying on the visible and actual commencement standard. 293
N.W.2d at 314.
In view of the fact that Utah has clearly adopted the
standard

that

visible,

on-site

construction

of

improvements

establishes the date upon which mechanics' liens attach and with
respect to which their priority is determined (See Calder Bros.
Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982); Western Mortgage
Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Construction Co., 18 Utah 2d 409, 412,
424 P.2d 437, 438 (1967)), architects7 and engineers7 services,
although clearly lienable under the Utah statute, do not establish
the date from which mechanics 7 lien priority is determined.
2.

Colorado case law is not binding upon this Court and
the minority position to which Colorado adheres should
be rejected.
The mechanic's lien claimants argue that the statutory

construction adopted by decisions of Colorado courts establishes
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the proper interpretation of Utah's mechanic's lien statute because Utah's statute was adopted from Colorado•
Brief at 12-15.)

(Appellants'

The mechanic's lien claimants cite the Utah

Supreme Court decision in Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care,
Inc. , 679 P. 2d 903 (Utah 1984), for the proposition that another
state's judicial construction of a statute is presumed to be
adopted along with the statute.

While the Jensen case acknow-

ledges the existence of such a presumption, the Court carefully
noted the exceptions to the rule, and in the case then before
it, refused to follow the judicial interpretations of the courts
of the sister state from which the Utah statute under review
was adopted.
The language of this Court in Jensen is instructive:
We recognize that when the Legislature
adopts a statute from another state, the
presumption is that the Legislature is familiar with that state's judicial interpretations
of that statute and intends to adopt them
also.
73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 333 at 46
(1974).
However, that canon of statutory
construction is not a hard and fast principle;
it is subject to a number of exceptions,
several of which are directly applicable in
the instant case.
In the first place, it
is not applicable where there have material
changes in the second statute.
[Citations
omitted.]
Secondly, the above-stated rule
of statutory construction is subject to the
exception that if the borrowed statute is
"given a different setting in the adopting
state11 the construction placed upon the statute in the originating state need not be
followed. [Citations omitted.]
Furthermore, the canon of construction
referred to is not applicable where the courts
of the adopting state are clearly of the
opinion that the foreign construction is
erroneous. [Citations omitted.] . . . .
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In any event this Court has indicated
a healthy and deserved skepticism about giving
too much credence to the various canons of
statutory construction. In Salt Lake City
v. Salt Lake County, Utah 568 P.2d 738 (1977) ,
the Court stated that rules of construction
may be useful when applied in appropriate
instances, ff[b]ut helpful as rules of construction are, they are useful guides but
poor masters; and they should not be regarded
as having any such rigidity as to have the
force of law, or distort an otherwise natural
meaning or intent. Their only legitimate
function is to assist in ascertaining the
true intent and purpose of the statute."
Id. at 741.
679 P.2d at 904-05 (emphasis added).

See also N. J. Singer,

Sutherland Statutory Construction § 52.02 (Sands 4th ed. 1984 &
1987 Cum. Supp.). 8
With respect to the adoption of the Colorado mechanic's
lien statute by the State of Utah, at least two of the exceptions
to the canon of construction are applicable.

First, there is a

material distinction between the mechanic's lien statute in effect
in the State of Colorado.

Second, Guaranty Savings respectfully

submits that the minority rule adopted by Colorado is clearly
erroneous and that the majority rule adopted by those other states
directly addressing this issue should be adopted.

y

The limited utility of the presumption on adoption of
judicial interpretations is illustrated by the fact that Colorado
adopted its mechanic's lien statute from California. See Chicago
Lumber Co. v. Newcomb, 19 Colo. App. 265, 74 P. 786, 789-90
(1903).
As discussed above, California is one of the states
whose courts have refused to establish priority from the commencement of architectural work. (See pp. 21-24, supra.)
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The decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court are based
on a statutory scheme significantly different from that extant
in Utah. The relevant language of the Colorado statute provides:
All liens established by virtue of this
article shall relate back to the time of
the commencement of work under the contract
between the owner and the first contractor,
or if said contract is not in writing, then
such liens shall relate back to and take
effect as of the time of the commencement of
the work upon the structure or improvement .
Colo. Rev. Stat. [1973] § 38-22-106.

(The quoted language is

identical to the Colorado statute in effect at the time of Utah's
"adoption11 of it in 1943.)

The Colorado statute also provides

a contract recording system which places all the world on notice
of

mechanic's

§ 38-22-101(3).

lien

claims.

Colo.

Rev.

Stat.

[1973]

The Colorado language is obviously materially

different from Utah Code Ann. (1953) § 38-1-5, which provides that
liens "relate back to, and take effect as of, the time of the
commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground for
the structure of improvement.11

(Emphasis added.)

The words

"on the ground" do not appear in the Colorado statute. Furthermore, the Utah statute does not incorporate a reference to work
under a contract, let alone the filing of contracts within county
records.
Other than the decisions of the Colorado courts in
Weather Engineering & Manufacturing, Inc. v. Pinion Springs Condominiums, Inc., 192 Colo. 495, 563 P.2d 346 (1977); and Bankers
Trust Co. v. El Paso Pre-Cast Co..
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192 Colo. 468, 560 P.2d 457

(1977), there is only one jurisdiction, Oklahoma, which might
arguably have been deemed to have adopted the same rule.

The

Oklahoma case, Midland Mortgage v. Saunders England Investments,
682 P.2d 748 (Okla. 1984), deals only with the Oklahoma statute
granting a lien to surveyors. There is no analysis by the Oklahoma court of any standard analogous to that consistently applied
by Utah courts to require that visible work be commenced on the
ground in order to establish the priority of mechanics' liens.
Guaranty Savings does not dispute that a contractor
providing architectural, engineering, or surveying work is as
entitled to a lien on the property as any other mechanic.

The

question, however, is whether such work constitutes commencement
or work for priority purposes.

Guaranty Savings respectfully

submits that the majority rule holding that such work does not
establish priority is the better reasoned position that effectuates the proper balancing of the interests of all parties dealing with real property.
3.

The "equal footing'1 doctrine compels the conclusion
that all mechanics' liens take priority from the time
of the first visible work of improvement on the ground.
The mechanic's lien claimants argue that the Court

should "recognize different points or methods of lien attachment."
(Appellants' Brief at 11.)

Such a position is clearly at odds

with the intent and express provisions of the Utah mechanic's
lien statute.

Section 38-1-10, Utah Code Ann. (1953), clearly

establishes that all mechanics' liens shall be on "equal footing"
regardless of when work is performed. The clear import of Section
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38-1-10 requires that all mechanics' liens take priority from
the same date and, by extension, share ratably in any recovery
against the owner.
But Section 38-1-10 does not deal with the issue of
priority as between mechanic's lien claimants and other secured
parties.

That issue is entirely dealt with in Section 38-1-5.

As consistently applied by this Court, Section 38-1-5 establishes
the requirement that work must commence on the ground.
pp. 12-16, supra.)

(See

Thus, the liens of all mechanics, including

those of architects, engineers, materialmen, and laborers, relate
to the time that work is commenced on the ground. Clearly, architects and engineers are not entitled to a separate determination
date nor should they be heard to argue that they are somehow
relegated to "second class status11 as a result of a requirement
that notice be imparted to all interested parties by the commencement of work on the property before work is deemed commenced
for priority purposes.

Indeed, the fact that the priority of

all mechanic's lien claimants is measured from commencement of
visible work on the ground is the very mechanism by which "equal
footing11 is accomplished.
The mechanic's lien claimants make much of what they
term the "anomaly of an unattached architect's lien,"

(Appel-

lants' Brief at 12) in the event that work is never incorporated
into a structure. This issue is really a red herring. To establish the architect's lien as against an owner of property there
is no requirement that it relate back to anything.
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The Utah

Supreme Court in Zions First National Bank v. Carlson, supra,
noted that an architect is entitled to file a lien on the property.

464 P.2d at 388.

See also Western Mortgage Loan Corp.

v. Cottonwood Construction Co. , supra, 424 P.2d at 437 (mechanic's
lien claimants could have filed liens).
The policy of equal footing may only be effectuated
by applying a single objective standard for all mechanics' liens
which binds all other parties who may deal with real property.
That standard is the establishment of priority of all mechanics'
liens under Section 38-1-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953) by reference
to the commencement of the first visible, on-site work of improvement.

POINT II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT LIEN CLAIMS
FOR WORK DONE AFTER A JUDICIAL DECREE OF FORECLOSURE
CANNOT RELATE BACK TO ANY WORK DONE PRIOR TO ANY SUCH
DECREE.
In an ingenious and deceptively attractive argument,
the mechanic's lien claimants assert the position that the effect
of a foreclosure is analogous to the effect of a lien waiver by
contractors performing initial work constituting commencement
of work on the ground, citing First of Denver Mortgage Investors
v. C. N. Zundel, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979), and Duckett v. Olsen.
699 P.2d 734 (Utah 1985).
This argument, however, misapprehends the distinct
policies and considerations which come into play in the different
contexts of foreclosures versus lien waivers.

The argument at-

tempts to analogize a voluntary act of an individual mechanic's
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lien claimant (which can affect only the rights of such individual) to the legal effects of a foreclosure (which establishes
by the force of law the rights of all parties with interests in
the property other than those superior to the rights foreclosed
upon).
The policy behind the Utah foreclosure statute is to
convey title free and clear of all subordinate liens and obligations on property.

Utah's foreclosure statute, Utah Code Ann.

(1953) § 78-37-3 deals specifically with unrecorded liens and
provides that:
No person holding a conveyance from or under
the mortgagor of the property mortgaged, or
having a lien thereon, which conveyance or
lien does not appear of record in the proper
office at the time of the commencement of
that action, need be made a party to such
action, and the judgment herein rendered,
and the proceedings therein had, are as conclusive against the party holding such unrecorded conveyance or lien as if he had
been made a party to the action.
This policy would be completely frustrated in the event that
mechanic's lien claimants who perform work after the date of a
foreclosure are entitled to priority which relates back to work
done prior to the foreclosure.

This result would render the

foreclosure law incapable of conveying clear title through the
extinguishment of all subordinate liens and encumbrances.
Furthermore, the foreclosure and its attendant consequences resulted in a suspension of work which interrupted the
continuity of work undertaken with respect to the project thereby
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cutting off the right to relate back prior to such suspension
of work.
Just as the foreclosure extinguished all encumbrances
on the Fee Property, the fact that all work was suspended on
the project for a period of approximately 12 months, (R. 1152-53),
eliminates any valid claim by the lien claimants to any priority
based on commencement of any work prior to that suspension.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated the principles applicable to
relation back of mechanics' liens as follows:
For a contractor's lien to relate back to
the commencement of work or supplying of materials by another contractor . . . both contractors' projects must have been performed
in connection with what is essentially a
single project performed under a common plan
prosecuted with reasonable promptness and
without material abandonment.
See, e.g. ,
Miller Electric Co. of Miami, Inc. v. Sweeny,
Fla. App., 199 So.2d 734 (1967); National
Lumber Co. v. Farmer & Son, Inc., 251 Minn.
100, 87 N.W.2d 32 (1957); Fryman v. McGhee,
108 Ohio App. 501, 163 N.E.2d 63 (1958).
Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982). See
also Duckett v. Olsen, 699 P.2d 734, 736 (Utah 1985).
Although the Utah court has not indicated what constitutes a "material abandonment" for this purpose, other jurisdictions have indicated that suspension of construction for several months requires a recommencement of work to which subsequent
mechanics' lien relate.

See, e.g., Mack Industries, Inc. v.

Donald W. Nelson, Inc., 134 So.2d 821 (Fla. App. 1961) (4-month
interruption showed failure to "prosecute with reasonable promptness") .

See Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 822, 837-39 (1965 & Aug. 1987
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Supp.).

Indeed, the Utah mechanic's lien statute explicitly

requires notices to be filed and an action to be commenced within
one year after any 30-day suspension of work.
(1953) § 38-1-11.

Utah Code Ann,

The Supreme Court of Colorado has stated that

suspension of work for more than the 3 0-day period (which starts
the running of the time for filing mechanics' liens) conclusively
prevents relation back prior to a subsequent recommencement of
work.

3190 Corp. v. Gould, 163 Colo. 356, 431 P.2d 466, 468

(1967) (dicta).
In addition, the decision of the Utah Supreme Court
in Western Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Construction Co.,
18 Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437 (1967) clearly demonstrates that
first work on a particular project is not necessarily the date
to which all mechanics' liens relate.

That decision implicitly

supports the notion that any material interruption of work requires a recommencement of work, even on a particular project,
to which subsequent mechanics' liens can relate.

POINT III.

ALTERNATIVELY, APPELLANTS' ARGUMENTS FAIL TO RECOGNIZE THAT MECHANICS' LIENS EXTEND ONLY TO SUCH REAL
PROPERTY AS IS NECESSARY FOR THE CONVENIENT USE AND
OCCUPATION OF THE IMPROVEMENT THAT GIVES RISE TO
THE LIENS.

The mechanic's lien claimants ignore the statutory-limitation on the extent of mechanics' liens imposed by Utah Code
Ann. (1953) § 38-1-4, as in effect at all times relevant to this
action: 9
9

See footnote 1, p. 2, supra.
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The liens granted by this chapter shall
extend to and cover so much of the land
whereon such building, structure, or improvement shall be made as may be necessary for
the convenient use and occupation thereof,
and in case any such building shall occupy
two or more lots or other subdivisions of
land, such lots or subdivisions shall be
deemed one for the purposes of this chapter;
. . . and the liens in this chapter provided
for shall attach to all franchises, privileges, appurtenances, and to all machinery
and fixtures, pertaining to or used in connection with any such lands, buildings, structures or improvements . . . .
(Emphasis
added.)
Court decisions from other jurisdictions with substantially identical statutes demonstrate that an improvement on a
single portion of an entire development does not entitle any
mechanic's lienor to a lien that extends to the entire property.
Pacific Coast Refrigeration, Inc. v. Badger, 52 Cal. App. 3d
233, 124 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1975); Livesay v. Lee Hing, 139 Or.
450, 9 P.2d 133 (1932) ; Tunis v. Lakeport Agricultural Park Ass'n,
98 Cal. 285, 33 P.63 (1893).

Those cases expressly reject the

argument that the lien extends to all property that may be benefited by a particular improvement.
In this case, work performed on the Heritage office
building does not give rise to a lien attaching to property on
adjoining parcels covering more than 4500 additional acres.
This additional property is not, and never has been, necessary
for the "convenient use and occupation" of the office building.
All on-site, visible work actually undertaken on the Heritage
Development related only to the Leased Property or the Permit
Property.

No party has shown that any visible on-site work was
- 35 -

done on the Fee Property, other than survey staking, before or
after the 1982 foreclosure.
The limitation on the extent of mechanics7 liens evinces
a dual purpose.

First, a laborer and materialman should have

the value of their work and materials as security against getting
paid.

Second, the extent of the lien is limited to the just

expectations of the lienor and other property of the owner remains unclouded, thereby not stifling further development.
In Pacific Coast Refrigeration, Inc. v. Badger, 52 Cal.
App. 3d 233, 124 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1975), a shopping center was
planned as one cohesive development and several construction
companies were engaged to build a supermarket as part of the
center.

Before completion of the center, the developer filed a

petition for bankruptcy, and mechanics7 liens were filed on the
entire center property including a vacant lot where, under the
overall plan, a service station was to have been built. Reversing
a broad scope interpretation by the trial court, the Court of
Appeals reasoned:
It may be argued that in view of the
evidence the [lower] court properly considered
the whole of the proposed shopping center as
"the land on which [ xthe work of improvement7 ]
is situated together with a convenient space
about the same" under the statutory provision.
That concept presents a certain difficulty
where, as here, the work is not undertaken
all at once under one general contract. When
the development is by stages, on separate
plots, the granting of lien on the whole to
anyone who contributes labor or material to
a particular unit could result in encumbering
the entire project because of the default of
one tenant or concessionaire. Moreover, it
could lead to serious conflicts.
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52. Cal. App. 3d at 245, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
The Pacific Coast Court held that mechanics' liens originating at the site of a supermarket did not extend to a vacant
lot intended for use as a service station, even though the supermarket and the proposed service station came under one consolidated plan and were mutually financially beneficial.

52 Cal.

App. 3d at 248, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
The Pacific Coast opinion cited with approval and adopted the analysis of Tunis v. Lakeport Agricultural Park Ass'n, 98
Cal. 285, 33 P. 63 (1893), in which the California Supreme Court
reversed a judgment which a mechanic's lien had been foreclosed
on an entire 60-acre agricultural park. The 60-acre development
consisted of a hotel, clubhouse, saloon, racetrack, stables,
grandstand, corrals and other improvements.

The particular

improvement originating the lien was the structure housing the
hotel, clubhouse and saloon.

Explaining the rationale behind

its decision, the Tunis Court opined,
The expression, "the land upon which any
building * * * is constructed, together with
a convenient space about the same, or so
much as may be required for the convenient
use and occupation thereof,11 should be construed to mean such space or area of land
as is necessary to the enjoyment of the building for the purpose and view in its construction. The uses to which a building is to be
put must manifestly, many times, determine
the quantity of land necessary to the convenient use and occupation thereof. If erected
as a mill for sawing lumber, the space required for a log and lumber yard would be
regarded as necessary to its use, while like
space around a similar building for a watch
factory might not be at all necessary. This
thing should be borne in mind: It is for the
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convenient use and occupation of the building
that the land about the same is given by our
statute; a flouring mill erected upon a large
grain ranch would require a given space around
it for the purposes incidental to its operations. It might require the whole ranch to
create business for it. But it would not
follow, under our statute, that the entire
ranch would be subject to a lien for its
erection. In the present case it is easy
to see that the racetrack, with its training
stables, grand stand, corrals, and other improvements, may be necessary to create business for the hotel, club house and saloon,
for which the building in question was constructed; but it is not at all apparent that
they are necessary to the convenient use
and occupation of the building for the purposes indicated. Their uses are foreign to
its purposes, except as they may tend to
bring customers to its doors.
33 P. at 63 (emphasis added).
The same reasoning was adopted in Livesay v. Lee Hing,
139 Or. 450, 9 P.2d 133 (1932).

There, a mechanic's lien arose

from the building of a hophouse on a 163-acre farm comprised of
three separate tracts of land.

The lower court held the lien

extended to all 163 acres and the Oregon Supreme Court reversed.
The Court reasoned that liens on a building do not extend to
all surrounding land that might support the use of the building,
but rather extends only to the land sufficient for the convenient
use of the building for the purpose for which it was built:
Where the land adjacent to and surrounding
the land occupied by the building may be used
for more than one purpose, or may be put to
other use than that which the structure was
intended to accommodate, [Ma convenient space
about the same, or so much as may be required
for the convenient use and occupation thereof "] means such space as is reasonably necessary to furnish access to and from the building, and around the building, so that it may
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be conveniently used for the purpose for which
it was built.
9 P.2d at 135.
In the instant case, the only work allegedly commenced
was on the office structures, also known as the barn and annex,
which are located on the Leased Property.

Thus any mechanics'

liens that may arise or attach by virtue of work on such improvements, i.e., the barn and annex, extend only to so much land as
may be necessary for their convenient use and occupation as office
buildings.

The fact that the office buildings were intended to

be used as the administrative and sales offices for a substantial ski resort development does not entitle mechanics' lienors
who rendered work on the office building structures (or whose
liens attach only by virtue of work upon such structures, such
as the architects) to claim a lien on the entire property intended
to be developed.
The proposed ski resort development encompassed several
distinct parcels which were separately described and as to which
the type of estate held by the developer, Heritage Mountain,
differed from piece to piece.

The office buildings or barn and

annex were located on only one parcel, the Leased Property.
The Fee Property and the Permit Property were not necessary for
the convenient use and occupation of the barn and annex. Indeed,
the offices and their functions could have been carried out at
any off-site location.

The location of the office building on

the ski resort site was merely a matter of convenience to the
entire development.

The development was not convenient and
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necessary to the use of the office structures.

Thus, any work

performed on the office building could establish priority for
liens only with respect to the Leased Property. 10
It would be unrealistic and bad policy to construe the
mechanic's lien law to encumber, and potentially cripple, a wideranging project contemplating millions of dollars, hundreds of
acres, and years of time by virtue of the fact that a single,
small improvement was begun on one corner of one parcel of property which is included within the development.

Such would be

the result if the work on such corner establishes the priority
for all work done on the project where construction loans have
been

advanced

only

for

a

particular

phase

of

the

project.

Financing for large-scale projects would simply be unavailable
since no lender would advance or even commit to advance the entire
amount necessary for a development of such scope.
Hotels, golf courses, restaurants, trains, skiing facilities, etc., developed as part of an overall scheme may well
contribute to the financial success of the whole as business is
generated and referred between them.

As illustrated in the case

law of other western jurisdictions cited above, however, the
mechanic's lien statute does not grant a lien to all providers

1U

The record demonstrates that work on the office building
had been suspended by the summer of 1982 prior to the foreclosure.
(R. 1148-49, 1156, 1245-46.)
Remodeling was later undertaken
after the recording of Guaranty Savings' Trust Deed. (R. 1152-53,
1238.) As such, Guaranty Savings is entitled to priority even
as to the Heritage interest in Leased Property.
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of services and materials on the entire development as soon as
work is commenced on the first structure.
Those jurisdictions which have construed language substantially identical to Utah Code Ann. (1953) § 38-1-4 have
clearly indicated that the focus of the inquiry is upon how much
land is necessary for the convenient use and occupation of a
particular improvement and not on the amount of land that may
be benefited by the construction of the improvement. The extent
of any particular mechanic's lien depends upon the character of
the improvement itself.
Section 38-1-4, Utah Code Ann. (1953), clearly contemplates that lot boundaries or other boundaries created by subdivisions of land shall mark the outside limit of land to which the
mechanics7 liens may extend.

In the instant case, any lien that

may have been established by virtue of work upon the barn and
annex cannot extend beyond the boundaries of the Leased Property.
As to the Fee Property, there was simply no improvement, before
or after the Paramount Foreclosure, to which any mechanics' lien
claimants could relate back.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the arguments set forth above, and the statutes and cases cited therein, this Court should affirm the district court's Order of Partial Summary Judgment as to the issue
of priority.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*******

KETCHUM, KONKEL, BARRETT, NICKEL )
& AUSTIN, dba KKBNA INCORPORATED
a Utah corp.,
)

Case Number

69,472

Plaintiffs,

vs.
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
et al,

RULINC

Defendants.
KENT W. WALKER and MICHAEL V.
LEE, a Utah partnership, dba THE
ARCHITECTURAL PARTNERSHIP,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.
SHELDON L. POLLACK CORPORATION
a California corporation, et al
Plaintiff,
vs.
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, et al.
Defendants.
********

The plaintiffs initiated this action against Heritage
Mountain and defendant Guaranty Savings & Loan Association who

received

a $16.9 million dollar loan from Guaranty which was

secured by deeds of trust recorded June 29, 1983 and September
15, 1983.

The lienholders consist of architects and engineers,

which include three plaintiffs, Ketchum, Konkel, Barrett, Nickel
and Austin, dba KKBNA

Incorporated; Walker

and Lee, dba The

Architectural Partnership; and Shelden Pollack Corporation.

The

defendants Langenheim Associates, Delta Geotechnical Consultants
and Forsgren-Perkins Engineering, P.A. all performed consulting,
engineering or architectural services.,
claimants

are

entities

associated

The other class of lien
with

Development, Inc., lending institutions

Heritage

(not claiming priority

over Guaranty) or contractors who performed
materials

subsequent

to

recording

Mountain

labor or supplied

Guaranty's

trust

deed

in

September of 1983.
The property which has been liened consist of three
distinct parcels, (1) 40 acres of property leased from the State
of Utah where a barn has been remodeled into an office building;
(2) 110 acre of undeveloped fee property; and (3) 4500 acres of
undeveloped U.S. Forest Service permits.
The above mechanic lien claimants are claiming priority
over the trust deeds of Guaranty Savings & Loan Association.
It is to be noted that prior to this action there have
been

two other

phases

to

this

litigation

Mountain's and various lien claims.
1.

First

Security

Associates, Civil No. 54367.
sheriff's

sale

on December

involving

Heritage

They are as follows:

Bank

of

Utah

v.

Wilderness

This proceeding culminated
23, 1982, based

upon

in a

a judgment

entered by the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen of the Fourth Judicial
District Court wherein it was decreed that:
"...each person whose conveyance or encumberance
is unrecorded or was recorded subsequent to the
plaintiffs' filing of the lis pendens be, and
hereby is, declared to be forever barred or
foreclosed of all right, claim, lien and equity or
other right of redemption in and to the total
property or any portion thereof."
The

sheriff's

sale

held

on

December

23,

1982

resulted

in

Paramount Life Insurance Company as the successful bidder and
there was no redemption and a sheriff's deed was later issued to
Paramount Life Insurance Company.
2. The second phase was a suit filed by Dwayne J. Sykes
v Wilderness Associates, Civil No. 62546, wherein Sykes attempted
to foreclose a mechanic's lien recorded with the county recorder
after the commencement of the First Security foreclosure action.
Sykes had not been named as a party in the first phase of the
litigation,

but

this

court

ruled

that

Sykes

claims

were

extinguished pursuant to the judgment and decree of foreclosure
in the first phase.
3.

The present proceeding is the third phase pursuant

to which the motions for summary judgment are now before the
court and the litigation involves Wilderness Associates and its
successor, Heritage Mountain
architects,

engineers

and

Development
surveyors,

Company, wherein

contractors

and

the

other

lending institutions all seek priority over Guaranty Savings &
Loan Association's trust deed.
The Court has considered all the memorandum filed by
parties to this lawsuit having

an interest

in the matter

of

priorities, and has heard oral argument from all parties desiring
to present the same to the court, and after reviewing this matter
further the court has concluded as enters the following:
RULING
The

motion

of

defendant

Guaranty

Savings

&

Loan

Association for partial summary judgment establishing the order
of priorities in this lawsuit is granted.
The court has concluded that, although a question of
first

impression

jurisdictions
concludes

in

to

in
the

be

the

the

State

United
best

of

Utah,

States, through
reasoned

the

majority

what

decisions

of

the

court

hold

that

"commencement of work", for the purpose of establishing priority
of recorded encumbrances require visible on-site commencement of
work to establish the priority of mechanic's liens-

Archtectural

and engineering work not on the site where improvements are to be
built,

and

survey

staking

for

the

purpose

of

establishing

boundaries, do not fall within the visible, on-site commencement
of work concept which the majority of the states adhere to.

This

interpretation is consistant with the language of Section 38-1-5
U.C.A. which provides that:
H

. . . liens . . . take effect as of the time of
the commencement to do work or furnish materials
on the ground . . . and shall have priority over
other encumbrances which . . . attached
subsequently to the time when . . . the structure
was commenced, work begun or first material
furnished on the ground, . . ."
The

reasons

generally

announced

for

the

on-site

requirement involve the commercial necessity of the financier of
the

project,

before

money

would

be

advanced

for

such

improvements,

to

be

accorded

priority

upon

recording

his

financing documents if there is no on-site indication that other
mechanic's have expended labor or furnished material prior to
such recording.
Without this protection, lending institutions would be
reluctant to lend money for the development of projects such as
the one in question.
It appears that certain mechanic's liens filed by those
improving the barn on the 40 acre leased tract were performed
after the filing of the last of Guaranty's trust deeds, and would
therefore not predate the filings of Guaranty nor preempt its
first position.
The claims of the architects although there work was
done after the second phase of litigation but prior to the filing
of Guaranty's trust deeds do not preempt Guaranty since their
work as well as the engineers, surveyors and other consultants
did not constitute "visible on-site improvements".
All other claims for work done prior to the recordation
of Guaranty's trust deeds are barred by virtue of the decision in
the first phase of the litigation

in this matter

(Civil no.

54367) and the subsequent ruling in phase 2 (Civil no. 62546).
The court notes that the architects and engineers do
have valid lien rights for the work they have done subject to the
priority determination as hereinabove made, and that those liens
apparently affect the overall project and to the extent that they
come subsequent

to the phase

1 ruling would

applying to all of the property of the project.

be valid

liens

The

crosss motions for

summary

judgment

by Nordic,

Walker and Lee and all other parties hereto seeking to establish
their priority over the trust deeds of Guaranty are denied.
Counsel
Association
partial

for

the

is directed

summary

DATED

judgment

defendant

to prepare
based

upon

at Provo, Utah, this

Guaranty
and

Savings

appropriate

the

above

Q, *

and

&

Loan

order

of

foregoing

' day of September,

1986.
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BALLIF, JUDGE

LeROY S. AXLAND, Esq.
DAVID R. OLSEN, Esq.
CARL F. HUEFNER, Esq.
MICHAEL W. HOMER, Esq.
of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Defendant
Guaranty Savings & Loan Association
700 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KETCHUK, KONKEL, BARRETT,
NICKEL and AUSTIN, d/b/a
KKBNA INCORPORATED, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, a Utah corporation;
and GUARANTY SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION, an Arkansas
savings and loan association,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
GUARANTY SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION'S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND JUDGEMENT
REGARDING PRIORITY
INTERESTS AMONG PARTIES

Defendants.
KENT W. WALKER and MICHAEL V.
LEE, d/b/a THE ARCHITECTURAL
PARTNERSHIP,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.

Consolidated
Civil No. 69472
Judge George E. Ballif

SHELDON L. POLLACK CORPORATION )
a California corporation, et al.)
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)

HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, et al.
Defendants.

)
)
)

On June 4, 1986, defendant, Guaranty Savings and Loan
Association, filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the
issue of the priority of claims on the relevant real property
which, is the subject matter of this litigation.

On June 30,

1986, defendant Nordic Constructors, Inc. filed a cross motion
for Summary Judgment on the same issue as did plaintiff Sheldon
L. Pollock Corporation and Norbert W. Pieper, AIA, Inc. on August
27, 1986. Various memoranda were filed by the parties in support
of and in opposition to the various motions filed herein and
the court heard oral argument from all parties desiring to present
the same to the court on Tuesday, September 9, 1986 at 2:30 p.m.
After consideration of the memoranda, argument of counsel, affidavits and untraversed deposition testimony, and being fully
advised in the premises:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That defendant Guaranty Savings and Loan Associ-

ation's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be, and the same
hereby is granted.
• 2 -

2.

That defendant Nordic Constructors, Inc.'s Motion

for Summary Judgment be, and the same hereby is denied.
3.

That plaintiff

Sheldon

L. Pollack

Corporation

and Norbert W. Pieper, AIA, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary
be, and the same hereby is denied.
4.

That defendant Guaranty Savings and Loan Associ-

ation's Deed of Trust dated June 17, 1983 and recorded in the
office of the County Recorder of Utah County, Utah on September
15, 1983, as Entry No. 28168 in Book 2078, pages 40-59 securing
payment in the amount of $16.9 million dollars (herein "Deed of
Trust") is a valid subsisting first lien upon the property described therein

(hereinafter "Property"), said Property being

situate in Utah County, Utah, more particularly described as:

Parcel #1
Beginning at a Point which is South 2233.73 feet and East
1353.38 feet from the Northeast corner of Section 6, Township 7
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North
193.37 feet; thence West 121.53 feet; thence N 22#23/00,/ W 123.00
feet; thence N 20,36'47" E 501.28 feet; thence S 89#59'28" E
20.00 feet; thence S 52*28'32" E 673.06 feet; thence S 11#27'09"
E 82.42 feet; thence East 209.11 feet; thence South 686.56 feet;
thence S 89e26'Q9" W 69.89 feet; thence N 11°27'09" W 305.86 feet;
thence N 81°10'45" W 664.63 feet to the point of beginning.
Parcel *2
Beginning at a point which is South 1457.44 feet and East
1381.49 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence S
82#28/18/r E 297.19 feet; thence S 35#46'49" E 390.19 feet; thence
- 3 -
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ll#27'09'r E 55.58 feet; thence N 52#28'32" W 673.06 feet to the
point of beginning.
Parcel #3
Beginning at a point which is South 1812.93 feet and East
1904.26 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence N
35#46'49" W 390.19 feet; thence S 82*28'18" E 230.12 feet; thence
South 286.40 feet to the point of beginning.
Parcel |4
Beginning at a point which is South 1457.44 feet and East
948.28 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence N
35°00/00,/ E 248.48 feet; thence S 55°00'00" E 354.87 feet; thence
N 89*59'28" W 20.00 feet; thence West 413.21 feet to the point
of beginning.
Parcel #5
Beginning at a point which is South 1095.69 feet and East
1309.00 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence S
49#07'07" E 450.31 feet; thence S 65#30'00" E 280.00 feet; thence
N 41#01/45" E 360.30 feet; thence South 713.45 feet; thence West
209.11 feet; thence N ll#27'09/f W 138.00 feet; thence North 286.40
feet; thence N 82°28'18" W 527.31 feet; thence N 55°00'00" W
314.87 feet; thence along the arc of a 700.00 foot radius curve
to the right 260.74 feet, the chord of which bears N 45#40'15"
E 259.24 feet to the point of beginning.
Parcel ie
Beginning at a point which is South 1095.69 feet and East
1309.00 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence along
the arc of a 500.00 foot radius curve to the left 219.09 feet,
the chord of which nears N 43p47'21" E 217.34 feet; thence S
58#45'49" E 133.73 feet; thence N 35*00'00" E 220.00 feet; thence
East 564.44 feet; thence S 3*19'16" W 407.49 feet; thence West
100.00 feet; thence S 41#01'45" W 360.30 feet; thence N 65#30'00"
- 4 -

W 280.00 feet; thence N 49#07'07" W 450.31 feet to the point of
beginning.
Parcel #7
Beginning at a point which is South 2 664.4 6 feet and East
35.24 feet from the North Quarter corner of Section 5, Township
7 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence S
89°26'09" W 530.26 feet; thence North 320.74 feet; thence S
66#59'43" E 575,11 feet; thence S 00°45'28" E 90.00 feet to the
point of beginning.
parcel #8
Beginning at a point which is South 1234.73 feet and East
2240.76 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence N
73°04'51" E 428.70 feet; thence S 00°45'28" E 1429.67 feet; thence
N 66°54'43" W 575.11 feet; thence North 562.81 feet; thence East
425.00 feet; thence North 125.00 feet; thence West 425.00 feet;
thence North 197.50 feet; thence East 425.00 feet; thence North
125.00 feet; thence West 425.00 feet; thence North 68.95 feet;
thence East 100.00 feet to the point of beginning.
Parcel #9
Beginning at a point which is South 1234.73 feet and East
2240.76 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence N
3#19'16" E 407.49 feet; thence East 75.56 feet; thence N 58°17'49"
E 358.21 feet; thence S 00M5'28" E 470.33 feet; thence S
73•04'51" W 428.70 feet to the point of beginning.
Parcel "D"
Commencing at a point located South 2233.72 feet and East
1353.37 feet from the Northwest Corner of Section 5, Township 7
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South
81°10'45" East 664.64 feet; thence South 11°27'09" East 300.00
feet; thence South 89°10'45" West along a fence line 596.98 feet;
thence South 87°52'55" West along a fence line 93.49 feet; thence
North 58*17' West along a fence line 15.65 feet; thence South
88*45'30" West along a fence line 12.69 feet; thence north 400.00
feet to the point of beginning.
• 5 -

Parcel "F"
Commencing at a point located South 1457.4 3 feet and East
955.78 feet from the Northwest Corner of Section 5, Township 7
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence East
405.70 feet; thence South 20#36'47" West 197.28 feet; thence
South 78•34'15" West 300.90 feet; thence North 09#36' West along
the Easterly bank of the Upper East Union Canal 247.74 feet to
the point of beginning.

Paraiflgyirt Life Parcel
Beginning at a point which is North 114.11 feet and East
388.71 feet from the East Quarter Corner of Section 6, Township
7 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence along
the arc of an 893.64 foot radius curve to the right 449.70 feet,
the chord of which bears North 20*35'02" East 444.97 feet; thence
North 35°00'00" East 556.99 feet; thence South 43°30'00" East
436.93 feet; thence South 670.00 feet; thence East 154.39 feet;
thence North 24.92 feet, thence North 88°45'30" East 12.69 feet;
thence South 58°17'00" East 15.65 feet; thence North 89* 16'50"
East 672.01 feet; thence South 10•02'24" East 402.68 feet; thence
South 21*26'15" East 442.45 feet; thence South 10*29'00" West
603.46 feet; thence North 89°17'00" West 575.53 feet; thence North
4'26'00" West 130.08 feet; thence North 6* 12'30" West 242.43 feet;
thence North 8*43'30* East 232.11 feet; thence North 3 3•34'00"
East 50.89 feet; thence North 89#30'30" West 505.62 feet; thence
South 0#08'00" East 43.42 feet; thence North 89°31'36" West 546.46
feet; thence North 42°55/46// West 75.43 feet; thence along the
arc of a 15 foot radius curve to the right 23.56 feet, the chord
of which bears North 2•04'20* East 21.21 feet; thence North
47t04'14" East 10.00 feet; thence North 42#55'46" West 80.00
feet; thence along the arc of a 15 foot radius curve to the right
23.56 feet, the chord of which bears North 87°55'4 0" West 21.21
feet; thence North 42°55'46" West 32.00 feet; thence along the
arc of a 222.73 foot radius curve to the right 190.86 feet, the
chord of which bears North 18°22'52" West 185.07 feet; thence
North 6°10'03" East 518.03 feet to the point of beginning.
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LEASED LANDS
U.S. Forest Service:
The Heritige Mountain resort area within Sections 22, 23, 24,
25, 26, 27, 33, 34, 35, 36, T. 6 S., R. 3 E. and Sections 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, T. 7 S., R. 3 E., Salt Lake Base and Meridian as delineated on the permit area map.
The Heritage Mountain resort area with Sections 22, 23, 24, 25,
26, 27, 33, 34, 35, 36, T. 6 S., R. 3 E. and Sections 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, To 7 S., R. 3 E., which is attached and made a part of
the permit.
City of Provo, Utah:
TRACT 1:
Beginning at a point on a fence line on the South line of
300 North Street in Provo, Utah, East 80.62 feet and South 738.84
feet from the West quarter corner of Section 5, Township 7 South,
Range 3 East, of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running
thence South 89 '31' 36" East along a fence line on said South
line of 300 North Street, 998.04 feet; thence North 0°08' West
along a fence line projected 43.42 feet to the North line of
300 North Street projected; thence South 89*30'3 0" East along
the North line of 300 North Street projected 505.62 feet to the
West bank of the Upper East Union Canal; thence southerly along
the westerly bank of said canal on the following courses and
distances: South 33*34' West 50.89 feet; thence South 8#43'30"
West 232.11 feet; thence South 6#12'30" East 242,33 feet; thence
South 4a26' East 130.08 feet to the North line of 150 North Street
projected; thence leaving the said bank of said canal and running
North 89*17' West along the line of the Street projected 144.05
feet; thence North 1*27'30* East 97.88 feet; thence North
89#15'39" West 231.01 feet; thence South 81#51'06" West 372.80
feet; thence South 0*49'12" West 40.51 feet; thence North 89°17'
West 739.91 feet; thence South 0o32'20" West 61.87 feet; thence
North 89°22'20" West 621.21 feet; thence North 0°20'20" East along
a fence line 654.96 feet; thence South 89°22'20" East along a
fence line of the South line of 300 North Street a distance of
623.50 feet, to the point of beginning.
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TRACT NO. 2:
Beginning at a point which is South 1872.32 feet and East
69.75 feet from the East quarter corner of Section 6, Township
7 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running
thence North 88•15'46* West 922.76 feet; thence along the arc
of a 297.89 foot radius curve to the right 295.20 feet, the chord
of which bears North 21*IT21"
East 283.27 feet; thence North
59#51' East 425.03 feet; thence South 89°22/20" East 411.47 feet;
thence South 0#32'20/r West 478.59 feet to the point of beginning.
5.

Defendant Guaranty Savings and Loan Association's

right, title, claim, lien and interest in and to the Property
is hereby adjudged to be prior and superior both in time and as
of right of the title, claims, liens and interests of all named
parties, and each and all of them, and of all other persons or
entities claiming any right to the title, claim, lien or interest
in and to the Property and the whole thereof.
6.

That the rights, title, claims, liens and interest

of all named parties in and to the Property are hereby adjudged
to be subsequent, junior, subordinate and inferior to the lien
and claim of defendant Guaranty Savings and Loan Association in
and to the Property.
7.

That the architectural and engineering work per-

formed with respect to the Property does not constitute "commencement of work" for purposes of establishing priority as provided in Utah Code Ann, § 38-1-5.
8.

That the architectural and engineering work per-
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formed with respect to the Property constitutes a lien on the
property as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 38*1-3.
9.

This Court expressly finds that there is no just

reason for delaying the entry of a Final Judgment on the issue
of the priority of interests among the various parties in this
action in and to the Property.

Accordingly, this Court hereby

expressly directs the entry of this Final Judgment against all
parties on the issue of Guaranty Savings and Loan Association's
prior interest in and to the Property and an appeal herefrom
may be taken pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
10.

The defendant Guaranty Savings and Loan Associ-

ation is awarded its costs of court herein expended.
DATED this

/ £ day of November, 1986.
BY TH£
THE COURT:
foRGE 32/BALLIF
l&fB
GEORGE
District Court Judge
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U t a h Code Ann.

(1953)

38-1-4. Amount of land affected—Lots and subdivisions—Mines—Franchises, fixtures and appurtenances.—The liens granted by this chapter shall
extend to and cover so much of the land whereon such building, structure
or improvement shall be made as may be necessary for the convenient
use and occupation thereof, and in case any such building shall oecupy
two or more lots or other subdivisions of land, such lots or subdivisions
shall be deemed one for the purposes of this chapter; and when two or
more mining claims, mines or valuable deposits, whether owned by the
same person or not, shall, with the consent of all, be worked through a
common shaft, tunnel, incline, drift or other excavation, then all the mining
claims, mines or valuable deposits so worked shall for the purposes of this
chapter be deemed one; and the liens in this chapter provided for shall
attach to all franchises, privileges, appurtenances, and to all machinery and
fixtures, pertaining to or used in connection with any such lands, buildings,
structures or improvements, mining claims, mines or valuable deposits
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907,
§§1377, 1379, 1381; C. L. 1917, §§3727,
3729, 3731; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-4.

38-1-5. Priority—Over other encumbrances.—The liens herein provided
for shall relate back to, and take effect as of, the time of the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the structure or improvement, and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which may have attached subsequently to the time when the
building, improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or first
material furnished on the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other
encumbrance of which the lien holder had no notice and which was unrecorded at the time the building, structure or improvement was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on the ground.
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907,
§§ 1384, 1385; C. L. 1917, §§ 3734, 3735;
R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-5.

38-1-10. Laborers' and materialmen's lien on equal footing regardless
of time of filing.—The liens for work and labor done or material furnished
as provided in this chapter shall be upon an equal footing, regardless of
date of filing the notice and claim of lien and regardless of the time of
performing such work and labor or furnishing such material.
History: Code Report; R. S. 1933 & C.
1943, 52-1-10.

1 £

U t a h Code Ann.

(1953)

38-1-11. Enforcement—Time for—Lis pendens—Action for debt not
affected.—Actions to enforce the liens herein provided for must be begun
within twelve months after the completion of the original contract, or
the suspension of work thereunder for a period of thirty days. Within
the twelve months herein mentioned the lien claimant shall file for record
with the county recorder of each county in which the lien is recorded
a notice of the pendency of the action, in the manner provided in actions
affecting the title or right to possession of real property, or the lien shall
be void, except as to persons who have been made parties to the action
and persons having actual knowledge of the commencement of the action,
and the burden of proof shall be upon the lien claimant and those claiming
under him to show such actual knowledge. Nothing herein contained shall
be construed to impair or affect the right of any person to whom a debt
may be due for any work done or materials furnished to maintain a personal action to recover the same.
History: R. 3. 1898 & 0. L. 1907,
§§ 1390, 1395; C. L. 1917, §§ 3740, 3745; L.
1931, ch. 5, § 1 ; B. S. 1933 & C. 1943,
52-1-11.

U t a h Code Ann.

(1953)

78-37-3. Necessary parties — Unrecorded rights barred.
No person holding a conveyance from or under the mortgagor of the property mortgaged, or having a lien thereon, which conveyance or lien does not
appear of record in the proper office at the time of the commencement of the
action, need be made a party to such action, and the judgment therein rendered, and the proceedings therein had, are as conclusive against the party
holding such unrecorded conveyance or lien as if he had been made a party to
the action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-37-3.
Cross-References. — County recorder,
Chapter 21 of Title 17.

Necessary joinder of parties, Rule 19,
U.R.C.P.
Parties defendant generally, Rule 17,
U.R.C.P.

Utah Code Ann, f!953, as amended 1987)

38-1-3. Those entitled to lien — What may be attached.
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any
premises in any manner and licensed architects and engineers and artisans
who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other like
professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the property
upon or concerning which they have rendered service, performed labor, or
furnished or rented materials or equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented by each
respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any other person
acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise. This lien shall
attach only to such interest as the owner may have in the property.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 1372,I,
1381, 1382, 1397; L. 1911, ch. 27, § 12; C.L.
1917, §§ 286, 3722, 3731, 3732, 3747; R.S.»•
1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-3; L. 1973, ch. 73, § 1;J
1981, ch. 170, § 1; 1987, ch. 170, § 1.
Compiler's Notes. — The 1981 amendmentfc
inserted references to renting and equipment•*
throughout the section.
The 1987 amendment deleted "all persons

who shall do work or furnish materials for the
prospecting, development, preservation or
working of any mining claim, mine, quarry, oil
or gas well, or deposit" following "manner" in
the first sentence, rewrote the second sentence
so as to delete a provision relating to the interest of a lessee of a mining claim, and made
minor changes in phraseology.

38-1-4. Amount of land affected — Lots and subdivisions
— Franchises, fixtures, and appurtenances.
The liens granted by this chapter shall extend to and cover so much of the
land whereon such building, structure, or improvement shall be made as may
be necessary for convenient use and occupation of the land. In case any such
building shall occupy two or more lots or other subdivisions of land, such lots
or subdivisions shall be considered as one for the purposes of this chapter. The
liens provided for in this chapter shall attach to all franchises, privileges,
appurtenances, and to all machinery and fixtures, pertaining to or used in
connection with any such lands, buildings, structures, or improvements.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, g§ 1377,
1379, 1381; C.L. 1917, §§ 3727, 3729, 3731;
R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-4; L. 1987, ch. 170,
S 2.

Compiler's Notes. — The 1987 amendment
rewrote the section to the extent that a detailed analysis is impracticable.

Colo, Rev. Stat, f19731

ARTICLE 22
General Mechanics' Lien
Crms reference:

38-22-101.
38-22-102.
38-22-103.
^s-22-104.
38-22-10>.
3S- 22-105.5.
38-22-i0ft.
38-22-107.
38-22-KW
38-22-109.
3S-2T-I10.
38-22-ill.
38-22-112.
38-22-113.
38-22-114.
38-22-1!5
38-22-116.
38-22-II7

For liens on moior vehicles, see § 4-9-302 and article <S at tale 42.

Liens in f;m>r o( whom —
when filed.
Payments — effect.
Attaching
o(
hen
—
enforcement.
Lien on mining propeny.
Property subject to Uen —
notice.
NoMcc o( ticn law.
Priority of lien — attachments.
U e n attaches lo water rights
and franchises.
RanK ol liens.
U e n statement.
Action comrienecu within six
months.
Jotndcr
o(
parties
—
consolidation of actions.
Allegations o( complaint.
Hcannc
—judgment
—
summons.
Disposition of proceeds —
execution.
Pr.mcs to action.
Costs.
Assignment o( lien — tailurc
to support hen.

38-22-118.
38-22-M9.
38-22-120.
38-22-121.
38-22-122.
38-22-123.
3X-22-<24.
3S-22-I25.
38-22-126.
18-22-C?

38-22-128.
38-22-12V.

38-22-130.
38-22-131.
38-22-132.
38-22-133.

Satisfaction of lien — failure
:o release.
Agreement to w:.ive —effect.
Rules of civil procedure app.v
Liens of
NUfvevurv and
engineers.
Lien under :\v;> ,..>ntra.ts —
effect.
Pr.vment to avoid mvaiid.
Other remedies run barred.
3ona fide purchase.
Disburscr — Motiee — diuv ;'
owner and Uisbur^cr.
Mcnevs foi Iter „ui as Ttadc
trust funds —di.bu.-scmcr.i:.
— pen;:i;v
Excessive amuuntb claimed
Principal contractor rn:iv provide
bond
i*r:or
to
commencement o\ wnrk.
Payment of caams bv NUICIV
Substitution ol N m d allowed.

Uen to be disehureeu.
Actum (n he hroumir • n bond
or undertaking.

3M-22-101. Liens in favor of whom • when filed. (1) Every person who supplies machinery, toois. or equipment in the prosecution of 'he work, and
mechanics, materialmen, contractors, subcontractors, builders, and ail persons of every class performing labor upon or furnishing directlv to (he ov.ner
or persons furnishing labor materials to be used in construction, ..iteration,
improvement, addition to. or repair, either in whole or in part, of .an building, mail, bridr.e. ditch, flume, aqueduct, reservoir, tunnel, fence, lailroau.
waeon road, tramway, or any other structure or improvement upon l.ind.
mciuding adjacent curb, euttcr. and sidewalk, and also architects, cnginects.
uraftsmen. and artisans who have furnished designs, plans, - L i s . rn:.p^
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys, or superintendence, o\
who have rendered other professional or skilled service, or he-towed laoot
in whole or in part, describing or illustrating, or superintend'-1:: suet, structure, or work done or to be done, or any part connected therewith, sluil
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have a lien upon the property upon which they have supplied machinery,
tools, or equipment or rendered service or bestowed labor or for which they
have furnished materials or mining or milling machinery or other fixtures,
for the value of such machinery, tools- or equipment supplied, or services
rendered or labor done or material furnished, whether at the instance of the
owner, or of any other person acting by his authority or under him, as agent,
contractor, or otherwise for the machinery, tools, or equipment supplied, or
work or labor done or services rendered or materials furnished by each,
respectively, whether supplied or done or furnished or rendered at the
instance of the owner of the building or other improvement, or his agent;
and every contractor, architect, engineer, subcontractor, buiider, agent, or
other person having charge of the construction, alteration, addition to, or
repair, either in whole or in part, of said building or other improvement shall
be held to be the agent of the owner for the purposes of this article.
(2) In case of a contract for the work, between the reputed owner and
a contractor, the lien shail extend to the entire contract price, and such contract shall operate as a lien in favor of all persons performing labor or services or furnishing materials under contract, express or implied, with said
contractor, to the extent of the whole contract price; and after all such liens
are satisfied, then as a lien for any balance of such contract price in favor
of the contractor.
(3) All such contracts shall be in writing when the amount :o be paid
thereunder exceeds five hundred dollars, and shall be subscribed by the parties thereto. The contract, or a memorandum thereof, setting forth the names
of all the partes to the contract a description :>f the property to b^ affected
thereby, together with a statement of the general character oi the work to
be done, the estimated total amount to be paid thereunder, together with the
times or stages of the work for making payments, shall be filed by the owner
or reputed owner, in the office of the conntv cierk and recorder of the county
where the property, or the principal portion thereof, is situated before the
work is commenced under and in accordance with the terms of the contract.
In case such contract, or a memorandum thereof, is not so filed, the labor
done and materials furnished by ail persons shall be deemed to have been
done and furnished at the personal instance of the owner, and such persons
shall have a lien for the value thereof.
(4) For tne purposes of this article, the value of labor done shall include,
but not be limited to, the payments required under any labor contract to any
trust established for the provision of any pension, profit-sharing, vacation,
health and welfare, prepaid legal services, or apprentice training benefits ioc
the use of the employees o( any contractors, and the trustee of any such
trust shall have a lien therefor.
<5) AH claimants who establish the right to a lien or claim under any of
the provisions of this article *hail be entitled to receive interest on any \ueh
lien or claim at the rale provided for under the terms of any ..ontrac: or
agreement under which the labor or material was supplied or. in the absence
of an agreed rate, at the rate of twelve percent per annum.
Source: L. I.W. p. 2M, § !; R. S. 08, § 4025:-C. L. § M42; CSA, C. 101.
§ 15; CRS 53, § S6-3-I; C.R.S. !%3. § 86-3-1; L. 65, n. x-w. § I; L. w . i«.
6')2, § l;L. 75.p. 142:, § 1.

Colo, Rev. Stat, f19731

38-22-106. Priority of lien - attachments. (I) All liens established by virtue
of this article shall relate back to the time of the commencement of work
under the contract between the owner and the first contractor,Cor. if s..ui
contract is not in writing, then such liens shall relate back to and take effect
as of the time of the commencement of the work upon the structure or
impri vement. and .%hall have priori:} over any lien or eneurahiance vii'sequent!}' intervening, or which may have been created prior thereto but which
was not then recorded and of which the lienor, under this article, did not
have actual notice. Nothing contained in this section, however, shall be construed as impairing any valid encumbrance upon any such land duly made
and recorded prior to the signing of such contract or the commencement ol
work upon such improvements or structure.
(2) No attachment, garnishment, or levy under an execution upon any
money due or to become due to a contractor from the owner or reputed
owner of any such property subject to any such lien shall be valid as against
such lien of a subcontractor or materialmen, and no such attachment, garnishment. or levy upon any money due to a subcontractor or materialmen o(
the second clavs. as provided in section 3N-22-10K (1) (hh from the contractor
shall be valid as against any lien ol a laborer employed Dy the uay or piece.
who does not furnish any material as classified in this article.
Source: L. ISW. p. 2M. § h: R. S. us. § 4030; C. L. § M47;CSA. C. in I.
§ 20; CKS 53. § sfc-.W C.R.S. !%3. § M-3-*
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10920 Wflsftirc Boulevard, Post Offlct Box 24019
Lot Aug*!*, California 90024
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May 27, 1983

TO:

ALL FNMA LENDERS

SUBJECT:

Utah Senate Bill 300

This legislation, effective May 14, 1983, provides in effect that assessment liens of condominium associations will
no longer be subordinate to mortgages or deeds of trust*
FNMA requires that liens of first mortgages or deeds of
trust have priority over such assessment liens.
We are advised that as a result of S.B. 300 funding for
condominium unit mortgages may no longer be available in
Utah. We also understand that the problems created by
S.B. 300 may be resolved by a special session of the legislature to be held on June 23, 1983*
In order to make funding available during this interim
period, FNMA will purchase otherwise eligible condorainium
first trust deeds, made prior to June 23, 1983, or participation interests therein*
Lenders must verify with any
applicable mortgage insurer or guarantor (MI/FHA/VA) that
any mortgage insurance or guarantee is not impaired by
reason of S.B. 300. Such loans need not have specific title
insurance to insure priority over such assessment liens, if
such insurance is not available. Purchases without such
title insurance will be made on the basis that the lender
will, by selling such loans, or participation interests,
agree to indemnify and hold harmless FNMA from (1) any requirement to pay condominium assessment liens which have or
may attain priority and (2) any loss caused by foreclosure
of such prior assessment liens.
With respect to pending applications for approval of conventional condominium projects in Utah, we will be unable
to issue final project approvals for such projects at this
time.
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